To illustrate the wide applicability of longitudinal matched employer-employee data, we study the simultaneous determination of worker mobility and wage rates using an econometric model that allows for both individual and …rm-level heterogeneity. The model is estimated using longitudinally linked employeremployee data from France. Structural results for mobility show remarkable heterogeneity with both positive and negative duration dependence present in a signi…cant proportion of …rms. The average structural returns to seniority are essentially zero, but this result masks enormous heterogeneity with positive seniority returns found in low starting-wage …rms. A factor analysis of the …rm-speci…c wage and mobility parameters contrasts …rms that have high turnover, low wages, and high returns to seniority with …rms that have low turnover, high wages, and low returns to seniority. This contrast is not associated with signi…cant di¤erences in value added per employee (productivity).
In this article, we reconsider the relation between earnings and mobility using newly developed longitudinal matched employer-employee data. Our research is positioned at the intersection of labor economics and human resource management; however, the techniques we use and the ideas we examine have broad applicability. We develop this idea immediately.
Longitudinally linked employer-employee data can be characterized as follows. Labor markets are used as a motivating example. The population frame from which
We would like to thank Steve Machin and two anonymous referees for extremely helpful suggestions. We also thank participants at various seminars and conferences, in particular at Crest, Insee (JMS), Stockholm University, European Community in Brussels, CNRS at Caen, and ESSLE in Ammersee. The data used in this paper are con…dential but the authors'access is not exclusive. For additional information, contact F. Kramarz (kramarz@ensae.fr). J. Abowd acknowledges …nan-cial support from the National Science Foundation (grant SBER 96-18111 to the NBER and SES 99-78093 to Cornell University) and from the National Institute on Aging (R01-AG18854-01).
such data are created is a record of all formal jobs in the economy over a speci…c time period. A job consists of an association between in individual (worker) and an employing entity (…rm 1 ). The longitudinally linked data are constructed following jobs over time and by adding information from two additional population frames: workers and …rms. Longitudinal information from both of these sources is integrated into the job frame. Then, an analysis sample is constructed based on individuals, jobs or employers according to the question under study.
Successful integration depends upon the records in the job frame containing a person and a …rm identi…er, which must also be used by the records in the individual and employer frames, respectively. For each job, the match between the worker and the employing …rm is fully speci…ed by these identi…ers. A direct consequence of this design is that once the integrity of the identi…ers is established, the job frame describes the complete graph connecting workers and …rms. The analyst can study the worker at a particular job in relation to other workers at the same …rm and in relation to other employers that worker has had. Identi…cation of most of the critical components of employment outcome heterogeneity is a direct consequence of connectedness of the workers and …rms in this graph.
In some economies, for example Sweden, the person identi…er on the job record is used in multiple data sources (on wages, employment, education, health, among others). In other economies, for example France, the …rm identi…er on the job record is used in multiple data sources (on performance, inputs, innovation, skill-structure, among others). This commonality of identi…ers is necessary, but not su¢ cient, for building a useful integrated employer-employee data structure. The identi…ers must also be relatively error-free and consistent over time. Finally, in order to specify the characteristics of any analysis sample, at least one of the three frames (job, individual, or …rm) must be a universe or census.
Our description, which was customized for labor economists, can be fully adapted to most other …elds in economics. Let us give a few examples.
In education, there are students and establishments (schools). A "job" is the enrollment relation between a student and a school. Ancillary information on students, for example demographic characteristics and family background, are added from the student frame. Characteristics of the establishment, for example teacher identity and other inputs, are added from the establishment frame. An analysis sample of students consists of following them over time and across di¤erent schooling establishments. Students potentially share the same teacher and study in the same establishment. Many existing data sources, often of administrative origin, have this exact structure. The economic and statistical techniques that we use here can be directly adapted to education economics.
In health economics, there are patients and hospitals. A "job" is the inpatient spell of a particular patient at a given hospital. Ancillary information on patients is integrated from the patient frame. Ancillary information on hospitals is integrated from the hospital frame. An analysis sample of patients can be followed over time as they are treated by di¤erent hospitals. In addition, a prominent input of medical care is physicians. Their association with particular hospitals or clinics is a characteristic matched from the hospital (or clinic) frame. There are doctors in medicine, both in these hospitals and in private practices. And, within hospitals there are various services with di¤erent specialties. Once again, most of the techniques that we use herein have direct applications to health economics.
In any of these, …elds similar questions can be posed and similar techniques can be used to answer them. The techniques we illustrate are based on an analysis of variance with two or more high-dimensional, non-orthogonal e¤ects. The questions can be paraphrased as follows: "What is the contribution of worker's (resp., student's; resp., patient's) observables and unobservables to the variance of wages (resp., grades in math or French; resp., medical tests, such as the level of cholesterol in the blood, or the costs of treatments)?"and "What is the contribution of the …rm (resp., school; resp., hospitals) to this variance?". Put di¤erently, in education, is it the school that makes the student good or is it the student that explains most of the variation in grades? In health care, is it the hospital (or the doctor) with the associated treatments and medicines that makes the patient healthy and cheap to treat or is it the patient who is inherently healthy or sick?"The answer to these questions is fundamentally identi…ed by the longitudinally linked data provided that the analysis sample is su¢ ciently connected, in the graph-theoretic sense, to estimate the decomposition. We provide a detailed example of how to conduct this analysis for wages with worker and …rm e¤ects below.
A second question can be posed for all these …elds. "Why do workers (resp., students; resp., patients) leave a …rm (resp., a school; resp. a hospital or a doctor)?" Is it because the …rm (resp., the school; resp., the hospital) is bad (low pro…ts, low pay, bad working conditions; resp., bad teachers or environment; resp., bad equipment and doctors) or is it because the worker is not productive (resp., does not test well; resp., is less healthy) in this environment?".
We also demonstrate how to answer this second question using the worker-…rm pair in this article. More precisely, we study the connections between …rm-level compensation, promotion, retention policies and …rm-level performance. We begin by relating a worker's inter-…rm mobility to …rm-speci…c compensation policies. Then, in our empirical analysis we use newly developed econometric methods and fully-integrated French employer-employee data to estimate some of the critical parameters of the models. As others have noted, particularly for France and the United States, the results tend to show enormous individual-and …rm-level heterogeneity in compensation, promotion, and retention policies. We characterize this heterogeneity by modeling its joint distribution in the populations of individuals and …rms. Finally, we recover some of the structural parameters of the …rm-level policies such as the central tendency of the "return to seniority"parameter.
The labor economics literature has attempted to measure the average return to seniority in models with limited heterogeneity. Abraham and Farber (1987) were the …rst to demonstrate that heterogeneity in the model for employment duration induced an upward bias in the measured average return to seniority, speci…cally, jobs with a longer expected duration were likely to be better-paying jobs and, therefore, longer seniority would be associated with higher pay but the return to an additional year of seniority, holding constant the expected duration of the job, was much smaller than the measured average return to seniority, ignoring expected job duration. Brown (1989) showed that the return to seniority is not constant; rather, it is higher during the …rst years of a job and diminishes to zero at the end of the employee's self-declared training period. In a series of articles, Altonji and coauthors, (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987 , Altonji and Williams, 1992 applied various econometric techniques that attempted to remove the bias in the average return to seniority due to unobserved heterogeneity in individual job durations. These estimates, very much in the spirit of Abraham and Farber (1987) , also indicated that the measured average return was upward biased and that the true return was closer to zero. In contrast, Topel (1991) used a model that included the possibility of bias arising from individual job search. This bias goes in the opposite direction of the job-duration heterogeneity bias leading Topel (1991) to consider both upward and downward biases. He concluded that the bias was downward in the uncorrected average return to seniority. More complete models of the sources of heterogeneity in the return to seniority lead to distributions of estimates that display individual, …rm and within-…rm heterogeneity as in, for example, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, (1999, AKM hereafter) , who …nd substantial heterogeneity in the returns to seniority in France (all of the previously cited papers used American data) with an average return of zero for men and women. More recent work by Margolis (1996) and Dostie (2005) , using French data, con…rm that simultaneous modeling of individual-and …rm-level heterogeneity produces estimates of the average return to seniority that are lower than the uncorrected estimates.
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A topic equally important but much less studied is the role of heterogeneity in …rm compensation, promotion and retention policies in determining individual, employer, and match outcomes. As Lazear (1995) noted in great detail, measures of …rm performance-such as productivity, value-added and pro…t-and measures of employment outcomes-such as retention, promotion and salary raises-ought to be related to choices made by workers and …rms regarding compensation policies, work rules, and alternative employment o¤ers. AKM studied both productivity and pro…t outcomes in relation to …rm-speci…c measures of compensation policy and individual compensation heterogeneity. They found that high-wage …rms were associated with higher productivity and higher pro…ts. High-wage workers were associated with higher productivity but not higher pro…ts. Other studies are reviewed in and Lazear (1995) .
We begin by presenting our estimating equations in section 1. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 presents estimation results for compensation and mobility parameters that account for potential mobility and heterogeneity biases that have plagued some of the previous analyses. The …rst set of results, which properly accounts for each of the biases, delivers estimates of the central tendency of compensation para-meters, such as the return to seniority and the structural job duration, that may be interpreted as structural in the same sense as the studies cited above. The second set of results, which relate measures of the compensation, promotion and retention policies to measures of …rm performance, must be seen as descriptive-not causal-but given the dearth of serious evidence they should be indicative of potential directions for further research.
Estimating Equations for Wages and Mobility
In this section we present our econometric model. We adopt a very ‡exible representation of the career process within the …rm. A career is modeled as a succession of wages from the start to the end of the job.
3 Statistically, the observation of a wage within a …rm has two components: the value of the wage and the presence of the worker in that …rm. Thus, we represent the career process within a …rm as a sequence of wages and presence indicators in this particular …rm. A worker i entering …rm j at calendar date t 0 (i) and leaving at date t f (i) has a career represented by:
: : : ; w it 0 (i)+s ; P it 0 (i)+s = 1; : : : ; w it f (i) ; P it f (i) = 1; w it f (i)+1 = :; P it f (i) = 0 where P it 0 (i)+s is an indicator function equal to 1 if the worker is employed in this …rm j at this date and 0 otherwise, w it denotes the wage the worker receives, and = : indicates that the value is not observed (for the sake of simplicity, we do not include the j subscripts).
We are trying to be ‡exible in modelling the worker's career. Consequently, we do not derive a path for (w; P ) from a preferred theoretical model. 4 Instead, we decompose the career process into two parts: a starting wage equation, that captures the external market e¤ects, and a …rm-speci…c model for wages and mobility, which depends upon the market e¤ects from the starting wage equation. This …rm-speci…c model and its estimation …rm by …rm is the core and originality of this article. The …rm-speci…c parameters of the model will most often be interpreted as an expression of the …rm-speci…c wage and retention policies.
As part of this approach, we do not account for …rm-speci…c hiring policies, because the data do not tell us which workers contacted the …rm but were not hired or which workers rejected a job o¤er. This is clearly a fascinating question but beyond our reach given the current data. Identi…cation would be based entirely on prior assumptions.
The Entry Wage Equation
Let us …rst consider a worker initial period at the …rm. The entry wage can be decomposed into two components. The …rst component, which is individual-speci…c, depends on worker characteristics and their prices in the labor market. Whatever the …rm the worker contacts, this component is interpreted as the mean of what that can expect from the labor market, given characteristics at that moment in time and no …rm-speci…c experience (tenure = 0). It includes all elements of the worker that are transferable from one …rm to another: experience, unobserved abilities, and so forth. The individual-speci…c part of the wage rate will be denoted as the "market"wage.
The second component of the wage rate corresponds to the job-speci…c part of the wage that results from the interaction of the worker and the …rm. It should thus depend on the job-speci…c productivity and on shocks that may a¤ect the …rm. The …rm-speci…c wage policy is also included in this component.
For each employment spell, the starting-wage equation at date t 0 (i), when worker i enters …rm j = J(i; t 0 (i)), is given by
X it 0 (i) denotes the variables describing the individual and the labor market that are time-varying but seniority invariant, i denotes a person e¤ect. Equation (1) includes also the initial component of the …rm-speci…c compensation policy, J(i;t 0 (i)) at hire as measured in the entry wage. The component " it 0 (i) is a zero mean error term re ‡ecting, among other things, the initial productivity of the match. All personspeci…c elements are transferable among …rms. Hence, worker i when moving from …rm j to …rm j 0 loses all elements of pay that are speci…c to …rm j and receives at entry in …rm j 0 the opportunity wage given by equation (1) using the new …rm e¤ect, j 0 and at the calendar date t 0 0 (i), the X variables at this calendar date. As in Topel (1991) , the returns to experience are directly estimated with this equation. For this reason, X it 0 (i) include experience variables as well as other variables related to observed characteristics of the individual and market characteristics. In this case, a bias may occur by not considering worker heterogeneity with respect to previous employment (past jobs).
5 To resolve this problem we introduce as explanatory variables the number of previous jobs.
The starting-wage equation is estimated by full least squares based on the technique described in Abowd et al. (2003) . These methods jointly estimate the …xed time-varying, individual, and …rm e¤ects. A graph-theoretic algorithm is applied produce the identi…able estimated person and …rm e¤ects. We include all observations that are at the beginning of a job (…rst year) for each worker. The coe¢ cientŝ ;^ i ;^ j are treated as known parameters for the …rm-speci…c compensation policy estimates.
The Firm-speci…c Model for Wages and Mobility
Worker i and …rm j throughout the life of the job spell jointly decide whether to separate or to continue the match. In our approach, and given the available data, quits and layo¤s are empirically identical. The worker's wage is observed after entry if and only if the worker and …rm pair jointly decide to continue the match. This process is very much in the spirit of work by Jovanovic (1979) , Flinn (1986) , Topel and Ward (1992) , Bushinsky et al. (2002) for micro-matching models or earlier work by Lillard and Willis (1978) , Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) for the whole economy.
At date t for a worker with seniority s, i.e., t = t 0(i) + s, after subtracting the market wage (the sum of the e¤ect of the market variables as measured by X it^ and of the individual …xed e¤ect^ i ) the wage and mobility process can be expressed using the following equations:
where we substitute j = J(i; t) for notational clarity, R itj is a latent variable expressing mobility out of …rm j at date t when positive (R = 1 P; using the above de…nition), Q s(i;t) itj is a vector of seniority-dependent variables that a¤ect the separation decision, quit or layo¤, j is the …rm-speci…c parameter vector describing the dependence of the separation decision on Q, and s(i;t) ij is a mean zero error term re ‡ecting productivity shocks. For the wage equation, Z s(i;t) itJ(i;t) denotes the variables indexed on seniority in the …rm and and " it denotes a statistical residual.
Let us consider the system (2) at the entry into the …rm. Since the worker is observed in the …rm at the …rst period, there is no choice for this variable to be negative, and the …rst observed wage is the entry wage.
Hence, the wage equation in this system is fully consistent with the entry wage equation (1) since all variables Z s(i;t) itJ(i;t) are equal to zero when s is zero, at entry, except for the intercept, j . For any …rm j, because all workers used in the estimation have zero seniority at entry, there is no mobility equation at the date of entry.
Our system makes job seniority endogenous, as noted by many authors (Abraham and Farber (1987) , Altonji and coauthors, (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987 , Altonji and Williams, 1992 . Better workers may leave the …rm because the …rm is low-wage and they received a better outside o¤er. Others might leave when the …rm considers that they are overpaid (given their productivity) and imposes a wage reduction. Should the …rst argument be true, selection within the …rm leads to under-sampling the best workers. The second argument leads to over-sampling them. These types of selection biases have potentially severe consequences on the wage equation estimates.
The econometric identi…cation of the selection process relies on the speci…cation and estimation of the correlation matrix between the various residuals together with exclusion restrictions among the di¤erent equations (variables present in the wage equation and absent from the mobility equations, and conversely).
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For example, a worker hired at date t 0 (i), who stays exactly two periods in the …rm is modelled with the following mobility and wage equations:
In order to model the statistical relations between past wages and mobility or, similarly, between future wages and mobility, we assume that the following correlation structure holds: A simple rewriting of the correlation matrix based on the normality assumption, presented in Appendix A, is useful for estimation since the likelihood does not involve multiple integration of the normal distribution. The correlation matrix above accounts for the possible correlation between mobility residuals, t ij and both past and contemporaneous wage residuals, " t 1 ij and " t ij ; respectively. We do not allow for a direct correlation between past and present wage residuals since such a correlation is already captured by the person e¤ect.
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The crucial point in our approach should now be clear: all parameters of the wage and mobility equations, apart from the starting-wage equation, are …rm-speci…c. For instance, in the wage equation there are returns-to-seniority parameters that are similar for all workers employed in the …rm and may di¤er from the returns-toseniority parameters estimated in other …rms. In addition, the …rm-speci…c returns to seniority are allowed to vary with the sex and education of the workers in that …rm. More generally, since the estimation is done separately for each …rm, the estimated parameters can be used to characterize the promotion and retention policies of the …rm. 6 Even though the normality assumption su¢ ces for identi…cation. 7 Recall that the person e¤ect is removed from the log-wage variable as shown above.
There are two kinds of exclusion variables included in the mobility equation (and not in the wage equation). The …rst one is classic, it captures measurable individual heterogeneity with respect to previous employment spells. These e¤ects are modelled using the number of previous jobs and the duration of the most recent previous job. The other group of variables in the mobility equation, but not the wage equation, re ‡ects the position of the worker in the age distribution at entry in the …rm. This variable is inspired by the literature on internal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1976) . According to these theories, some …rms have restricted entry ports. In such …rms, hiring (entry to the …rm) occurs place at a young age and is associated with a particular career path at the …rm. Workers in the lower part of the age distribution at entry should be less mobile on this theory. By contrast, when …rms hire workers at various ages and when the worker-…rm pair is concerned about the quality of the match, one expects to see more separation among the workers who are younger at hire. In each case, the position of the worker in the age distribution at entry is a good candidate for a variable to be to identify mobility-it a¤ects the mobility process without directly interfering with the wage formation process.
The …rm-speci…c mobility and wage process requires enough within-…rm variability for the e¤ect of each of the explanatory variables to be identi…ed. For this reason, estimation is conducted in …rms with su¢ cient observations. We set a minimum within-…rm sample size of 200 observations for this paper. We use maximum likelihood estimation …rm by …rm. Parameters can only be estimated when there is enough within-…rm variation in workers' observed characteristics. For instance, there is no point in estimating a male-speci…c mobility intensity when the …rm only comprises males. Hence, we use the following strategy. Before estimation, we automatically locate all …rms for which one of our explanatory variables has insu¢ cient within-…rm variation. This variable is withdrawn from the explanatory variables of the relevant …rm-level equation. Of the above 4,000 …rms, 45% have at least one such variable. For some variables, such as the male indicator in the mobility equation, the coe¢ cient is identi…ed for more than 99% of the …rms. However, the proportion falls to 82% for a variable such as the returns to seniority for workers with 10 years or more of seniority. The coe¢ cient is then set to zero in the …rm-level analyses and to "missing value"in the tables describing the parameters (Tables 1 to 6).
Data Description
We use data from the Déclarations annuelles des données sociales (DADS), a 1/25th sample of the French work force with information from 1976-1996 on the matched worker-…rm side and data from the BRN on the performance of the …rm side. We describe these data in turn.
The DADS
The "Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales"are a large collection of matched employer-employee information collected by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). The data are based on a mandatory employer report of the gross earnings of each employee subject to French payroll taxes. The universe includes all employed persons. Our analysis sample covers all individuals employed in French enterprises who were born in October of even-numbered years, excluding civil servants. Our extract runs from 1976 through 1996, with 1981, 1983 and 1990 excluded because the extracts were not created for those years. The initial data set contained 16 millions observations, each corresponding to a unique enterpriseindividual-year combination. The observation includes an identi…er that corresponds to the employee (called NNI below) and an identi…er that corresponds to the enterprise (SIREN). For each observation, we have the exact starting date and end date (day of the year and year) of the job spell in the establishment, and an indicator for fulltime/part-time/intermittent/at home work-status of the employee. Each observation also includes, in addition to the variables listed above, the individual's sex, month year and place of birth, current occupation, total net nominal earnings during the year, annualized gross nominal earnings during the year for the individual. Employer characteristics are the location and industry of the employing establishment.
2.1.1. Observation Selection, Variable Creation, Data Editing and Imputation. An observation is identi…ed by a combination of two identi…ers, the …rm id and the person id. The SIREN number has an internal structure that allows us to check for coding errors. The NNI number has no such internal control. Even though 90% of recentlysubmitted DADS …les are sent by the responding …rm using a electronic media, the situation in the 1980s was quite di¤erent. At that time INSEE had to perform the data entry from paper records. Data entry errors in the NNI occurred (for example, exchanging two digits of the NNI, error in one of the digits, and so forth). This phenomenon is well-known at INSEE but, despite many attempts, no general way of solving this problem was found.
8 As a consequence, some observations have a NNIyear-SIREN combination such that no other observation has the same NNI. As a joint product, some NNI-SIREN combinations have a unique missing year. Consider now the case of a worker with observations in, say, 1978 and 1980 in the same enterprise (SIREN) but no observation for 1979. To be true, this would mean that the worker would be employed until some date in 1978 (depending on the number of days worked, December 31 most likely) and also employed after some date in 1980 (depending on the number of days worked, January 1 most likely) in this …rm but not employed at all during year 1979. This is very improbable because of the regulations governing layo¤s in France, in which workers may be recalled by their previous employers even after some period of unemployment. The suggestions of D. Verger (chief of the Division Revenus, in charge of the DADS at the beginning of the nineties) led us to adopt the following solution. Whenever an observation was missing in a given year when the same NNI-SIREN combination existed for the preceding and the following year, we created an observation for the missing year with the same NNI-SIREN combination. (This added 193,148 observations.) Earnings are computed as the geometric mean of the preceding and following wages (in real terms). All other variables are taken at their preceding year value.
Because of the 1982 and 1990 Census, the 1981 , 1983 and 1990 DADS data were not available. We used the same principle as the one described above to impute missing observations. Hence, imputation was performed only for those individuals that were present in the same …rm in 1980 and 1982 or 1982 and 1984 or 1989 and 1991 observations to the sample.) All variables were imputed as above. A more precise description of the construction of some variables in the data set are presented in the working paper version of this article.
Finally, as in AKM, we eliminated observations for which the logarithm of the real annualized total compensation cost was more than …ve standard deviations away from its predicted value based on a linear regression model of this variable on sex, region, experience, and education (see once more the data appendix in AKM).
After these selections and imputations, the …nal data set contains 13,770,082 observations, corresponding to 1,682,080 individuals and 515,557 …rms.
Seniority Imputations for 1976.
To estimate the starting wage equation (1), the wage equation for observations with zero seniority, we concentrate on all job observations for the year of the individuals entry into the …rm. Because of the left-censoring in the creation of the DADS, there is a problem with observations in 1976-no information is available about the actual start date for individuals who were already employed at a particular …rm at the start of this year. We use AKM's imputed seniority as an indicator of recent hire or not. We assumed that all workers with strictly less than two years of imputed seniority in 1976 "just entered" their employing …rm. Since shortterm contracts were virtually nonexistent in those years, most workers had relatively long employment spells.
9 After selecting only those observations corresponding to the year of entry in new job, we have 4,616,093 observations. These include 1,535,758 individuals (some persons are only employed by their 1976 employer and never leave it) and 480,360 …rms (some …rms only employ workers with 2 years of seniority in 1976; in general these are very small …rms with only one DADS individual).
The BRN and Other Firm-level Variables
2.2.1 Within-…rm Employment, Seniority and Skill Structure. To measure the employment structure of our French …rms, we construct …rm-level variables based on some of our entry wage equation estimates. First, we take the estimated^ from the entry wage equation to generate the variable x^ for each person at entry to the …rm. Then, we generate the various quartiles of the within-…rm distribution of this variable. These quartile boundaries are used to control for a mixture of the experience and time-varying skill structure of the …rm since they are based on a univariate measure derived from the market wage. Similarly, we compute the quartiles of the within-…rm distribution of the estimated person-e¤ect, an e¤ect which is the sum of an unobserved component and of the time-invariant observed characteristics (education and sex).
Finally, and reminiscent of the dual labor market literature (Doeringer and Piore, 1976) , we compute the within-…rm distribution of age of the workers at entry. The idea is that some …rms may hire most of their workers after they completed education (internal labor markets) whereas other …rms hire workers at all ages.
2.2.2
Indicators of Performance. Indicators of performance are drawn from an administrative …rm-level data source, the annual report on pro…tability and employment by enterprises (Béné…ces industriels et commerciaux, BIC) for all …rms reporting under the BRN regime (Béné…ces Rééls Normaux), the usual reporting regime for most …rms (only the very small …rms, in particular the zero employees …rms, are excluded). The data covers 1985 to 1996. The variables listed below, and described extensively in AKM, are averaged over the period for all available years from the BRN.
Variables that we will consider in the following are :
Firm-level employment (expressed in thousands of workers),
Real capital stock per employee (de…ned as total assets divided by the industryspeci…c price index of physical capital per employee) also called the capital-labor ratio,
The fraction of stable employees (measured as the within-…rm average probability of being employed next year conditional on being employed this year in the …rm) also called the stability index,
Real value added inclusive of labor costs per employee, and
Operating pro…t per unit of capital.
Estimation Results

The Starting-wage Equation
Estimation of the starting wage equation (1) requires some identi…cation assumptions. The individual and …rm e¤ects are identi…ed, relative to the overall constant, in …xed-e¤ect estimation when the observations are part of a connected group. Ancillary assumptions are required to identify the person e¤ects, …rm e¤ects, and in some cases the residual. First, in the case where the individual has at least two for the many small disconnected groups in the French data. 10 First, the individual e¤ect is estimated separately from the residual only for workers whose entry wages are observed for at least two jobs. Second, for those workers who are observed in a single job, the residual is set to zero and the individual e¤ect is set non explained part of the wage as a consequence. Because we focus hereafter on relatively large …rms for which at least 200 observations are available, the estimated …rm …xed e¤ect is relatively well estimated (see Abowd et al., 2003 , for the standard errors formulas).
The explanatory variables (X it ) are actual labor force experience (up to a quartic), an Ile de France region indicator, a full-time vs part-time indicator, and year indicators. These variables are fully interacted with sex. To control for the endogenous number of starting-wage observations (some workers churn more and, therefore, start more jobs), we control for the past number of jobs in the equation (using indicator variables). In addition, we include both a person and a …rm e¤ect. Since both person and …rm e¤ects are high-dimensional, standard estimation techniques, which rely on matrix inversions or sweep operators, can not be applied. Instead, we use a minimization technique based on the standard conjugate gradient algorithm that solves the OLS normal equations directly (see, again, Abowd et al., 2003) .
Starting wage results are presented in Appendix B. Since this regression controls for …xed person and …rm e¤ects, the reported coe¢ cients identify the e¤ects of changes in the time-varying attributes. Results show that the returns to experience are larger for men than for women. In addition, the …rst job pays less than all subsequent jobs. Not surprisingly, jobs in the Ile de France region are better paid. Finally, the time indicators show a decreasing trend in real starting wages, re ‡ecting the worsening of entry conditions for young workers in the French labor market. The starting wage equation can also be viewed as an attempt to capture initial heterogeneity, at the date of the worker's hire into the …rm, in the spirit of Heckman (1981) .
The Firm-speci…c Mobility and Wage Equations
For each of the 5,000 …rms in the sample for which there are enough individual observations to proceed, we estimate by maximum likelihood the set of equations described in (3). Convergence occurs for 4,015 …rms using the automated maximization programs. We did not try to re-estimate models for those …rms where the algorithm did not converge.
11 Firm-speci…c parameters can only be estimated when there is 10 The largest connected group covers more than 95% of the The many small disconnected groups are a consequence of the data being a 1/25 th sample. We identi…ed the person e¤ects in the disconnected groups by setting their within-group average to zero. We identi…ed the …rm e¤ects in the disconnected groups by including the group mean in the …rm e¤ect and setting the overall average …rm e¤ect to zero.
11 In previous versions of this research, we succeeded in obtaining convergence for 95% of …rms after multiple attempts but none of the subsequent results were changed by inclusion of these …rms. In addition, we were less con…dent in some of the coe¢ cients obtained for those …rms where convergence enough within-…rm variation in workers'observed characteristics (see the discussion in Section 1).
The …rms used in these estimates are not representative of all French …rms in two ways. The estimation sample over-represents large …rms, which tend to survive longer, because of our requirement that at least 200 worker-year observations per …rm be available. In addition, …rm-speci…c observations may correspond to many di¤erent workers in a few years or to fewer workers observed for more years. Thus the within…rm composition of the sample re ‡ects the average completed duration of job spells at that …rm. We can assess these potential sources of non-representativeness in our …rm sample by comparing our …rms with the universe of …rms contained in the BRN, our sample covers 36% (resp., 30% in the BRN) of the workers working in the private sector in 1985 (resp., 1996) and 83% (resp., 75%) of …rms employing more than 1,000 workers.
We turn now to interpretation of the estimated …rm-speci…c determinants of wage growth and mobility. We have estimated values for the e¤ects of di¤erent worker characteristics for each …rm. These estimates require some caution in interpretation. Our main interest lies in the between-…rm heterogeneity of these e¤ects. Indeed, if the e¤ects could be ascertained by direct measurement (e.g., a …rm survey), then, the data would directly reveal the between …rm variability. Of course, direct survey measurement of a concept like the rate of increase of mobility as a function of seniority is fraught with its own di¢ culties-justifying our reliance on indirect statistical measures.
The …rm-speci…c e¤ects of interest in our work must be estimated from samples of workers at the …rm. Hence, all observed variation in the estimated e¤ects confounds both between-…rm and within-…rm variation. The between …rm variation re ‡ects di¤erences in …rm-level policies. The within-…rm variation is estimation error arising from the incompleteness of our samples or the inadequacy of our models. Although it will not be easy to make inferences about the between-…rm di¤erences, we will try to do this using three methods. First, we summarize the between-…rm heterogeneity in the estimated e¤ects (Tables 1 and 2 ) while also drawing attention to the heterogeneity in the statistical precision of the estimated e¤ects (Tables 3 and 4) . Second, we simulate the nonlinear within-…rm e¤ects, in e¤ect treating the within-…rm parameter estimates as modes of the posterior distribution of the parameters. The simulations allow us reduce the in ‡uence of the estimation error on inferences about between-…rm heterogeneity by averaging the heterogeneity measures over many simulated …rm-level outcomes. Finally, we analyze the between-…rm correlations of the estimated e¤ects using a method that explicitly adjusts the covariance matrices for estimation error in the …rm-level e¤ects. While focusing on the dispersion of measures of statistical signi…cance is not a conventional technique for summarizing multi-level models like ours, it is instructive because it shows the reader the hazard of concluding that large di¤erences in estimated e¤ects necessarily arise from between-…rm heterogeneitywas obtained in the supplementary searches. For these reasons, in this article, we decided to restrict attention to …rms for which the maximum likelihood procedure converged immediately using a grid search for the starting values of the correlation coe¢ cients 1j and 2j . estimation error within …rms is also important.
We begin with the …rst assessment, direct interpretation of the distribution of …rm-speci…c e¤ects and their estimation error. The distributions of estimated …rm-speci…c e¤ects for the mobility equation is provided in Table 1 . The distribution of the …rm-speci…c e¤ects for the wage equation is in Table 2 . Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of the conventional measure of statistical signi…cance (the Student-t) for the e¤ects in the mobility and wage equations, respectively.
Most parameters are easy to interpret. In both the mobility and wage growth equations, seniority e¤ects are estimated as splines. For the mobility equation, the spline is based on the following functional form for the probability of moving (leaving the …rm):
+ [2a 1 + 3a 2 + 5a 3 + a 4 (sen 10)] 1(10 anc) g where 1(:) denotes an indicator function and sen denotes seniority. The spline function is linear, continuous everywhere, with changing slopes at 2, 5, and 10 years of seniority. For instance, a positive coe¢ cient for a 1 ; as reported in Table 1 , means that workers are more likely to move as seniority increases from zero to two years. After two years of seniority, the coe¢ cient a 2 applies and measures the di¤erence (either increasing or decreasing, depending on its sign) from the coe¢ cient a 1 . For instance if a 2 is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, it means that workers with two to …ve years of seniority have the same probability of leaving the …rm as workers with no more than two years of seniority.
Similarly, we implement spline for seniority in the wage equation as follows:
where, once again, a positive b 1 means that at the beginning of their careers in the …rm workers'wages increase with seniority; and b 2 picks up where b 1 stops: if b 2 is greater than b 1 returns to seniority increase after two years of seniority and if it is less than b 1 then returns to seniority decrease after two years (these returns can be ‡at when b 2 is equal to zero or may even decrease if b 2 < 0).
Heterogeneity in the Mobility Equation.
The mobility equation measures the probability of separating from the employer. A positive coe¢ cient corresponds to a larger propensity to move. Consider …rst the base propensity of …rms to separate workers. Heterogeneity of this propensity is captured by between-…rm di¤erences in the intercept of the mobility equation, which we estimate separately for three distinct sub-periods: 1976-1980, 1982-1989, and 1991-1996 . Within …rms, the estimated sub-period constants are very highly correlated (not shown in table) , therefore, it is reasonable to interpret them as re ‡ecting a long-term component of the …rm's mobility policy. A large positive sub-period constant means that the …rm has many separations or, equivalently, that it is a high-turnover …rm. Interestingly, results in Table 1 show that baseline mobility is very heterogeneous. While this could be due to between-…rm di¤erences or within-…rm estimation error, Table 3 con…rms that 35% of …rms are low-turnover …rms whereas 10 to 20% of …rms are high-turnover …rms. This retention policy of …rms also depends on worker types. For instance, we see that the worker's sex appears to matter for less than 30% of …rms. But, for roughly 20% of …rms, males tend to stay signi…cantly longer periods than females whereas the opposite appears to hold for about 10% of …rms. For the rest of …rms, there is no measured di¤erence in the mobility behavior of men and women. By contrast, seniority in the previous job matters for more than 90% of …rms, and the e¤ect is always the same: workers with long tenure in their previous job stay longer in their current job.
Tenure in the current …rm often has the opposite consequences for mobility; that is, our results show negative duration dependence for job seniority but with substantial heterogeneity. We investigate this more thoroughly below. For the …rst two years of seniority, increases are associated with less mobility for 30% of the …rms and with more mobility for approximately 15% of the …rms. Hence, 30% of …rms try to stabilize their less-senior workers whereas 15% of the …rms exhibit churning since workers with two years of seniority or less tend to move more often than workers with more than two years of seniority. The probability of leaving the …rm increases with seniority in most …rms for workers with at least ten years of seniority compared to workers with less seniority in the same …rm.
Focusing on variables that re ‡ect potential human resource policies of the …rm, we consider …rst the relation between the separation probability and the individual e¤ect from the starting-wage equation (a measure of worker's quality as evaluated by the market). For 30% to 40% of the …rms there is a strong negative relation between the starting-wage person e¤ect and the separation probability, as indicated by the distribution of Student-t statistics in the row labeled "person e¤ect"in Table  3 . A much smaller percentage of …rms (less than 10%) have a strong positive relation between the starting-wage person e¤ect and the separation probability. Hence, good workers, as evidenced by their labor market valuations, tend to have longer tenures in a large fraction of …rms.
An alternative measure of the heterogeneity of human resource policies comes from examining the evidence for internal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1976) . In this view, …rms can create labor markets within their own organization. There are privileged ports of entry and the whole career takes place within the …rm through moves between positions. To assess this theory, we have created for each …rm a distribution of ages at entry. In Tables 1 and 3 , this …rm-speci…c distribution of age at entry is summarized by the variables labeled "Entry in Qn of the age at entry distribution," where n is the …rst, second or third quartile, respectively (with n = 4 as the reference group). If entry at a young age is associated with a career within the organization, we should see a negative relation between mobility and workers who enter in Q1 or Q2 of this age-at-entry distribution. For instance if a …rm hires workers for some jobs on a short-term basis and other workers for core jobs on a long-term basis at a speci…c age (mostly young), then one expects to see that entry in the …rst or the second quartile of the age-at-entry distribution is associated with lower separation probabilities. Direct examination of the relevant rows of Tables 1 and 3 shows that there is not much evidence for this interpretation. There is actually a strong positive relation between entry in the …rst quartile of the age-at-entry distribution and the separation probability for about 50% of the …rms and a strong negative relation (as predicted by internal labor markets) for less than 5%.
By contrast, when …rms hire workers at various ages and when the worker-…rm pair is concerned about the quality of the match, then one expects to see more separations for workers entering in the bottom of the age distribution. As noted above, this is precisely the case. In more than 30% of …rms, workers entering in the …rst three quartiles of the …rm-speci…c age-at-entry distribution move more often than workers entering in the top quartile of the age distribution (unreported results show that these three coe¢ cients are highly positively correlated). Virtually no …rm (less than 5%) preferentially retains workers entering in the bottom of the age distribution. These results are largely inconsistent with most versions of the internal labor market theory.
Finally, approximately 30% of the …rms try to keep workers with technical degrees (as opposed to workers with general education, either low or high), as can be seen from the rows labelled "low general education"and "high general education"in Tables  1 and 3 since "technical degrees" is the omitted category. Workers with general education (the coe¢ cient for low and for high are very strongly positively correlated) separate from those …rms more often than those with technical degrees.
Heterogeneity in the Wage Equation.
We have jointly estimated the …rm-speci…c mobility and wage equations (2). The dependent variable in the …rm-speci…c wage equation is the real log wage rate minus the opportunity wage as measured using the coe¢ cients estimated from the starting-wage equation (1). This opportunity wage is the wage that this worker would receive, in expectation, on the market, at the moment of entry at a random employer. Because this opportunity wage includes^ i , the person e¤ect, unobserved person heterogeneity is (at least partially) controlled. Some variables present in the mobility equation are not included in the wage equation.
Results for the …rm-speci…c wage equation are presented in Table 2 (for the coe¢ cients distribution) and Table 4 (for the Student-t statistic distribution). Many variables are generally statistically di¤erent from zero at the 5% level throughout the range of …rms. Only seniority in its various guises (as a spline or interacted with education and sex) displays 40% or less of the estimated coe¢ cients that are signi…cant at this level. Even more striking is the almost completely symmetric (around zero) distribution of many wage coe¢ cients.
As with the mobility equation, the best summary of the compensation policy of the …rm is captured by the sub-period constants, which are highly positively correlated within …rms (not shown in the tables). A positive sub-period constant corresponds to a high-wage …rm and a negative one to a low-wage …rm. Roughly 20% of the …rms are low-wage …rms (at the 5% level) and 30 to 40% of the …rms are high-wage …rms (again, at the 5% level).
Some additional Table 2 results deserve further comment. That the coe¢ cient for part-time compensation is positive in a substantial fraction of the …rms (40%) may appear surprising. However, this variable is also present in the starting wage equation. Hence, what is estimated in the …rm-speci…c parameter is the di¤erence between part-time compensation on the market (included in the opportunity cost of time) and the …rm-speci…c part-time policy. Hence, a positive coe¢ cient on the …rm-speci…c part-time coe¢ cient means that the …rm pays its part-time workers better than the market (as compared to a full-time worker with all the same characteristics) and conversely a negative coe¢ cient means that the …rm pays its part-time workers worse than the market rate.
It is striking to see that returns to seniority in the …rst two years of a job-to take a question that has attracted a lot of attention-are signi…cantly negative for 15% to 20% of the …rms whereas they are positive for 20% of the …rms. These negative returns are still present at higher tenure levels. In fact, the estimated …rm-speci…c seniority coe¢ cients are strongly positively correlated. Hence, around 20% of French …rms have negative returns to seniority; 20% have positive returns to seniority, and 60% of French …rms have returns to seniority that are virtually zero (not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level). This result con…rms previous …ndings of AKM or, more recently of Dostie (2005) using a similar data set but completely di¤erent estimation techniques. Notice also that comparing the 5th percentile with the 95th percentile for the male-speci…c returns to tenure we see that 20% of …rms provide higher returns to tenure to women and 10% to 15% reward male tenure more than female tenure. Results are roughly similar for returns to tenure for our di¤erent levels of education. In general, some …rms appear to favor low-education workers, other …rms appear to favor technical education (the omitted category), and …nally some …rms focus on the high-education group. Those …rms that pay low-education workers high wages also pay their high-education workers high wages (see Table 6 ).
3.2.3. Heterogeneity of Seniority E¤ects in the Mobility and Wage equations. Because interpretation of the seniority e¤ects requires (at a minimum) simultaneous assessment of seven coe¢ cients (three sub-period constants and four seniority spline coe¢ cients) in each equation, there is no simple way to disentangle between-…rm heterogeneity from within-…rm estimation error. To provide a graphical display of the joint pattern of seniority e¤ects in the two equations, we simulated each …rm's mobility and wage equation parameters by drawing 1,000 times from their posterior distribution.
12 For each draw from the posterior distribution of the parameters we 12 We sampled from the natural conjugate posterior for the normal regression model for the wage formed the mobility-seniority pro…le, estimated using the average constant for the three sub-periods and the four spline coe¢ cients, and the wage-seniority pro…le (estimated with and without the intercept; when using an intercept, we used the average of the three sub-periods). Averaging the simulations greatly reduces the in ‡uence of within-…rm sampling error when estimating the quantiles of the distribution of the return to seniority: the simulated distribution of these quantiles is very tight, implying that they have very little sampling variability. Grouping the …rms on the basis of this estimated distribution captures between-…rm heterogeneity in the returns to seniority. We grouped the …rms into three categories based on the simulated distribution of the return to two years of seniority (excluding the intercept): the lowest quartile, the middle two quartiles, and the highest quartile. Within each of these three groups we averaged the mobility-seniority pro…le (probit index) and the wage-seniority pro…le for all simulations of …rms in that group. Figure 1 shows the average estimated relation between wage growth and mobility, as a function of seniority, for …rms in the lowest quartile of the return-to-seniority distribution. Figure 2 shows the same set of relations for …rms in the middle two quartiles of the return-to-seniority distribution. Figure 3 shows the …rms in the highest quartile. All three …gures are displayed on the same scale.
Dispensing with the middle …rst, Figure 2 shows that the predominant pattern in French industry is no return to seniority in the wage equation and a very modest increase in the separation rate over the …rst 10 years of service. Figure 2 also con…rms that the dominant policy in this group of …rms is a lower base separation rate than in the average …rm (negative intercept).
13 Figure 1 shows that …rms in the lowest quartile of the return to seniority distribution have a negative return to seniority over the …rst 10 years, a higher base separation rate (as compared to the middle group), and about the same rate of increase in the separation rate as the middle group. Figure  3 shows that the highest quartile of the return to seniority distribution has a very substantial positive return to seniority, a higher base rate of separation (compared to the middle group) and a much stronger increase in separation probabilities over the …rst 10 years of seniority.
3.2.4. Some Initial Evidence for the Existence of a Mobility Policy. Although we have not developed a full structural model of the relations among the various parameters of a …rm's mobility policy, one way to begin examining this question is to consider the between-…rm correlation across the various estimated coe¢ cients of the mobility equation and the asymptotic normal posterior for the probit model for the mobility equation. The mode of the posterior distribution in both cases was the maximum likelihood estimate of the …rm-speci…c parameters and the dispersion matrix was the maximum likelihood estimate of the coe¢ cient covariance matrix. 13 The reference person in this simulation is female, full-time, no experience, zero person e¤ect, technical education, entry in the fourth quartile of the age distribution, zero prior seniority. This a¤ects the location of the intercept, which should be compared to the other two graphs and not interpreted absolutely. equation. These correlations are presented in Table 5 . We correct these correlations to reduce the in ‡uence of within-…rm estimation error in the …rm-speci…c coe¢ cients. 14 In Table 5 , as well as in those that follow, the most signi…cant relations are highlighted in bold. For instance, we see that high-turnover …rms (based on the …rst sub-period intercept) are also …rms where the separation rate of workers increases as they go from zero to two years of seniority. High-turnover …rms (again, based on the …rst sub-period intercept) tend to keep workers entering at relatively younger ages (based on the coe¢ cient of entry in the …rst quartile of the age-at-entry distribution). Highturnover …rms tend to separate workers with high or low general education (hence, separate workers with a technical education). Similarly, …rms in which males are mobile are also …rms in which separation probabilities increase with tenure. But, they are also those …rms in which workers with general education (as opposed to technical education) are least mobile and tend to have decreasing mobility with tenure. Few …rms have a mobility policy that di¤ers for men and women.
Interestingly, the person e¤ect, which measures worker's external quality as estimated from the entry wage equation, is only mildly related to other elements of the retention policy of the …rm. By contrast, education (general versus technical) appears to be an important element of …rms'mobility policies. Firms where workers with a general education separate more are also …rms where workers who enter at a young age (in Q1 of the …rm-speci…c age-at-entry distribution) move more often. They are also …rms in which workers with high seniority in their previous job separate more often. Finally, in these …rms, even though workers with a general education separate more often than those with a technical education, this tendency is decreasing with seniority.
3.2.5. First Evidence for the Existence of a Pay Policy. Next we examine the correlation between the various estimated coe¢ cients of the wage equation. These results are presented in the bottom panel of Table 6 . As AKM found, there is a negative correlation between the …rm-speci…c intercept and returns to seniority in the wage equation. Firms that pay high wages tend to have low returns to seniority, evidence of a "zero pro…t" condition. Focusing on the male coe¢ cient, it appears that …rms that pay males higher wages than females, all other things equal, are the high-wage …rms with low returns to seniority. Finally, …rms that pay high wages to workers with a technical education (i.e., not general) also have larger returns to seniority for all workers.
14 The derivations are shown in Appendix C. Related methods are described in Fuller (1987) and Deaton (1988) . Similarly, our performance analysis in a later subsection takes account of the sampling variance induced by the …rm-speci…c estimation, again as described in Appendix C. This correction sometimes entails a loss of observations or even of variables. For instance, when a coe¢ cient is almost never signi…cant in any …rm, the sampling variance of the estimated coe¢ cients is always large and, therefore, the true variance of the population parameter (obtained as di¤erence between the estimated total variance of the coe¢ cients and the estimated sampling variation of the coe¢ cients; see Appendix C) becomes negative. For such variables, we do not present corrected correlations.
3.2.6. A Second Analysis of the Mobility and Pay Relation. Figures 1 to 3 were our …rst attempt to interpret the evidence on the relation between mobility and pay. The between-…rm correlations between the estimated coe¢ cients of the mobility equation and the estimated coe¢ cients of the wage equation, presented in the top panel of Table 6 , provide us with additional evidence. These results allow us to examine more precisely the initial evidence for joint mobility and pay policies. Very few …rm-speci…c coe¢ cients of the wage equation are correlated with …rm-speci…c coe¢ cients in the mobility equation. The central correlation to examine is that between the constant in the wage equation and the constant in the mobility equation. Here, the message is very clear: …rms that pay high wages also have a low turnover rate and …rms that have large returns to seniority are also those where workers are more mobile.
These results recon…rm what we showed in Figure 3 . Therefore, returns to seniority should not be viewed as a compensation device for workers with long tenures in …rms with a stable workforce but as an incentive device that tries to counteract the potential adverse e¤ects on capital accumulation of high inter-…rm worker mobility. Furthermore, high-wage …rms are …rms where the most able workers (large person e¤ects) tend to separate most frequently. But they are also the …rms where mobility decreases with seniority, where workers with technical education tend to stay longer, and where workers who entered at an early age (in Q1 of the age-at-entry distribution) tend to move more often.
In Tables 2 and 4 , we present the estimated coe¢ cients and estimated Student-t statistics for the correlation between the mobility error term with the wage error term (future, 1 and past, 2 ). Here again, the heterogeneity is daunting: 20% of …rms have a signi…cant (at the 5% level) and negative 1 whereas slightly less than 20% of …rms have a signi…cant and positive 1 . Similarly, more than 30% of …rms have a signi…cant and negative 2 whereas 15% have a signi…cant and positive 2 . A larger (more positive) 1 means that workers who face a positive shock to mobility also face a positive shock to their future wage. This is a potential re ‡ection of …rms trying to counteract workers' decisions to accept outside o¤ers. Alternatively, the result may mean that workers who have a tendency to move face very good prospects in their origin …rm. Conversely a low 1 means that workers who face a positive shock to their mobility also face a negative shock to their future wage. Once again, the mobility decision is an equilibrium outcome in which workers who will not get promoted may decide to move. The question of who initiates the potential separation is virtually impossible to resolve. Now, 2 captures the correlation between the past shock on wages and the mobility decision. When positive, workers move after an unexpected wage increase. Apparently, this move should be induced by the worker's decision. When negative, workers stay after an unexpected wage increase, potentially resulting from a joint decision. As already mentioned, the latter case (joint optimization) is much more common: an unexpected wage hike is associated with workers staying an additional year in most …rms.
In Tables 7 and 8 respectively, we examine the between-…rm correlation of 1 (mobility shock and future wage shock), 2 (mobility shock and past wage shock), and (standard error of the wage shock) with the estimated coe¢ cients of the mobility and wage equations, respectively. Firms with a high 1 are low mobility …rms, as can be seen from the negative correlation between the intercept (…rst sub-period) and 1 . Furthermore, these low mobility …rms also have relatively small 's, as evidenced by the positive correlation between these parameters, which might be due to smaller …rm size or more constraints induced by collective agreements and compensation rules in such …rms. As could be expected given the positive association between high wages (as measured by the intercept in the within-…rm wage equation) and low mobility (as measured by the intercept in the within-…rm mobility equation), high-wage …rms tend to have large positive 1 's, negative 2 's and relatively small 's. Recall that a positive 1 means that, in such …rms, workers with a positive shock on future wages are more likely to be mobile. Hence, in these high-paying, low-mobility …rms, mobility seems to be due to quits, potentially for better jobs. An (unreported) between-…rm regression of on observed characteristics of the …rm, such as employment, the industry, the skill level of the workforce, and the labor capital ratio shows that, not surprisingly, large …rms have large . It also shows that …rms with large employ high wage workers and have relatively low capital-labor ratios. A similar regression shows that …rms with large 1 are in fact …rms that are highly capital intensive (large capital labor ratio), but that size of the …rm per se is not related to 1 . By contrast, …rms with large 2 are …rms with relatively little capital and, once again, size of the …rm per se is not related to 1 . All of these results are consistent with the result that 1 and 2 are strongly negatively correlated and that 1 and are also negatively correlated.
A Summary of Human Resource Policies.
To gain a better understanding of potential relations among these various …rm-speci…c e¤ects beyond the simple correlations that we just presented, we performed a principal component analysis of all these estimated coe¢ cients, i.e. those that characterize the mobility policy, those that characterize the pay policy, and those that characterize their relations. Factor estimates, using the covariance matrix corrected for the within-…rm parameter estimation error (see Appendix C), are presented in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 shows the eigenvalues and Table 10 shows the factor loadings for the …rst four axes. The results can be summarized as follows. The …rst four axes capture 61% of the variance. These four dimensions are built on the following linear combinations. The reader is cautioned to remember that the factors being constructed are linear combinations of the …rm-speci…c e¤ects of the indicated variables on the indicated outcome and not linear combinations of the variables themselves.
The …rst axis contrasts high-wage and low-mobility …rms with those that pay low wages and are high-mobility …rms. It may be helpful to completely explain this interpretation. The column labeled "Factor1"in Table 10 shows three large positive loadings for the three sub-period constants in the mobility equation. When these constants are positive, the …rm is a high mobility …rm (the probability of separation is higher regardless of the characteristics of the individual). The same column also shows three large negative loadings on the sub-period constants in the wage equation. When these constants are negative the …rm is a low-wage …rm regardless of the characteristics of the worker. For this reason we interpret this factor as increasing in the cluster (high-mobility, low-wage) or decreasing in the cluster (low-mobility, high-wage). The high-wage …rms also hire relatively older workers whereas the high-mobility …rms mostly hire workers at younger ages, as measured by the …rm-speci…c age-at-entry coe¢ cients. This con…guration of policies is clearly consistent with the existence of many short-term formal contracts. Among high-mobility …rms, because workers are more likely to move as seniority increases, returns to seniority are high in the …rst …ve years, potentially as a device designed to keep some carefully selected workers.
The second factor loading axis combines experience and education. The factor groups …rms in which mobility is increasing with experience and workers with technical education are better paid in contrast with …rms in which stability is decreasing with experience and workers with general education are better paid.
The third axis requires more subtle interpretation. The factor contrasts lowwage …rms (negative sub-period constants in the wage equation) that are also highwage …rms for workers with a general education (positive coe¢ cients on the two general education characteristics in the wage equation) with high-wage …rms that don't favor one type of education over another. Interestingly, the fourth axis also revolves around pay choices for the di¤erent education types. It contrasts highwage …rms with relatively low wages for the technically educated and low returns to seniority with low-wage …rms with high wages for the technically educated and large returns to seniority. Such …rms are neither low-nor high-turnover.
Of course, such bundles of characteristics do not exist to help the analyst describe …rms. These characteristics should stem from …rms'choices that have to be related to their underlying productivity, employment, or capital choices. We try to say more about this in the next subsection. We note in summary for this subsection that a …rm-level regression of the four factors on industry indicators demonstrates that these policies are not associated with any speci…c industry. Hence, these contrasts are mostly a within-industry phenomenon.
The Performance Equations.
Our performance equations are presented in Table 11 . Each column has the same format: a …rm-level performance outcome is related to the four factor-analytic axes that best summarize the estimated parameters, the …rm's skill structure, industry indicators, the capital-labor ratio, and employment (for the analysis of value added).
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The table presents results for log employment, the stability index (de…ned in the data section), log (capital/labor), log value-added per employee, and operating pro…t per unit of capital. All these equations are very much in the spirit of those presented in AKM but they improve in many dimensions over them. First, the mobility policy is present whereas it was absent from AKM. Second, the pay policy comprises many more parameters, which are estimated on almost twice as many observations and controlling for the endogeneity of workers' mobility (which was assumed to be exogenous, conditional on the person and …rm e¤ects in AKM). Notice however that matching the DADS data with external sources such as the BRN reduces the number of available observations from 2,507 for the correlations to approximately 1,800 for these performance equations.
We …rst discuss the results for log employment. Although nothing structural should be inferred from our estimates, we still expect to capture descriptively important elements of human resource management policies. Large …rms tend to hire workers with low person e¤ects, a result potentially surprising given their frequent use of human resource departments. However, screening on a large scale maybe di¢ -cult. Considering the personnel policy as measured by the factor-analytic axes, we see that (very) large …rms are often relatively low-wage …rms and high-mobility …rms.
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Some high-wage …rms that compensate their workers with technical education well also tend to be large (third factor). Similarly, …rms that keep their more experienced workers tend to be large …rms.
Turning now to the capital-labor ratio, …rms with large values of K=L resemble …rms that have relatively small employment. High-wage …rms that are also high-wage …rms for workers with general education have relatively large capital-labor ratios. In addition, skills (as measured by observables or unobservables) are positively associated with a high capital-labor ratio.
Some …rms are able to reduce the turnover of their workforce whereas others are not, as re ‡ected in the stability index. Factors related to low separation rates matter in each of our four estimated factor-analytic axes. There are a variety of ways of achieving low separation rates and these are related to the di¤erent outcome variables through the estimated factor loadings rather than directly. Hence, combinations of policies are associated with our …rm-level outcome variables as Ichniowski et al. (1997) found for high-performance workplaces in the steel industry .
A more natural measure of …rm performance is value-added per employee. Here, the message is striking: no factor-analytic axis is associated with an e¤ect on productivity. Therefore, compensation and/or mobility strategy do not seem to be correlated with productivity. Put di¤erently, given any such strategy, some adopting …rms are more productive while others are not. Should we be surprised? Not necessarily. First, these e¤ects control for …rms'skill structure and capital-labor ratio. Our left-handside variable is a measure of total factor productivity rather than labor productivity, more likely to be a¤ected by human resources policies.
17 Second, …rms are productive for reasons that go beyond human resource management strategies. However, even though compensation and retention strategies do not appear to have an impact on productivity, the quality of the workforce matters. This is con…rmed by the positive relation between unobserved but compensated quality as measured at entry, in particular at the top of the distribution of starting-wage person e¤ects. By contrast, 16 Remember that most of our …rms are large since we restrict attention to those with at least 200 individual observations to estimate the …rm-speci…c e¤ects in our model. 17 The direct correlation between labor productivity and wages is clearly positive in our data.
observable quality at entry a¤ects productivity at the bottom of the skill distribution. Therefore, hiring policies appear to matter for productivity even though other human resource policies appear to have a smaller e¤ect, if any. Finally, the estimates for the pro…t variable shows that the main contrast is between high-and low-turnover …rms, even though these are not associated with measurable productivity di¤erences. Potentially, low turnover …rms, because they are also high-wage …rms, make lower pro…ts even though they are as productive as highturnover …rms. High wages may therefore re ‡ect relatively strong union power and signi…cant rents accruing to workers.
4.Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to show the bene…ts of using longitudinally linked worker…rm data to investigate issues that have been central to labor economics and human resource management for years. To do so, we set up a descriptive estimating framework to help us think about the relation between mobility and wages for an individual, both from the worker's own perspective as well as from the employer's perspective. The data sources were based on a very large, longitudinal employer-employee data set for France, the DADS. The system of equations was estimated with many …rm-speci…c e¤ects, very much relying upon the perspective adopted by authors such as Baker et al. (1994a,b) with the distinctive feature that we capture elements of the outside labor market, at entry through an entry wage equation with both person and …rm e¤ects as well as at exit by explicitly modelling the joint mobility and wage processes, whereas these authors could not. The results are destructive of the homogeneous view of the labor market in which …rms adopt very similar strategies. In fact, the amount of heterogeneity in the policies adopted by the …rms is daunting. After documenting this heterogeneity, we tried to characterize what compensation and retention strategies could be in such a world. To do so, we used a simple factor analysis that was able to guide us and show that four factors gave a useful summary view of the heterogeneity. We focus here on the …rst factor, which appears to give a very simple and clear-cut overview of our results. The main contrast between high-wage, low-mobility …rms where returns to seniority are low (even negative) and low-wage, high-mobility …rms where returns to seniority are relatively high (in a country where the average returns to seniority are lower than in the United States, even compared with Altonji's results) gives a good …rst-order approximation of the French landscape. Recent job search and matching models (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002, and Woodcock, 2003) with person and …rm heterogeneity appear to be able to generate exactly this type of e¤ect. Other dimensions contrast …rms that favor general education with …rms that favor more technical education. We show that these …rm-level factors appear to be related to inputs, more precisely capital and labor, that the …rm uses to produce. Finally, all such choices appear to be unrelated to value-added per worker, showing that there are multiple routes to productivity enhancement.
On the methodology side, this paper uses some newer, recently developed, tech-niques for analyzing the matched employer-employee data. It also contains a non trivial number of methodological …rsts. To name but a few, the …rm-by-…rm (maximum likelihood) estimation strategy, the correction for the estimated nature of the parameters characterizing the …rm policies, the joint modelling of wages and mobility at the …rm level, and the identi…cation strategy relying on exclusion restrictions based on variables that can only be constructed using the matched worker-…rm aspect of the data (for instance the age at entry within the …rm-speci…c age distribution). In addition, all techniques and models presented here can be used almost identically in other …elds of applied research such as health or education, as advocated in the introduction.
We believe that the analysis presented here opens more avenues of research than it closes doors and solves problems. But, we see it as an important next step in understanding the substance as well as the methods to use when analyzing …rms'hiring, retention, compensation, or more generally human resource management policies. New methods should also be developed that would allow us to perform an analysis of workers'…rm to …rm movements.
Appendix A: The Likelihood Function for the Firm-speci…c Model of Wages and Mobility
Consider the starting-wage equation (1) and the …rm-speci…c wage and mobility equations (2) in the text and all de…nitions associated with those equations. We derive the likelihood for the …rm-speci…c model of wages and mobility in this Appendix. After entry in …rm j, and at each value of seniority s(i; t), the worker and …rm mutually decide to continue or terminate the employment relation. The latent variable R itj = Q s(i;t) itj j + s(i;t) ij corresponds to the observation R itj whether the job goes on at date t. A wage rate is observed for s > 0 if and only if the employment relation continues. At date t for a worker with seniority s, (after subtracting the e¤ect of the market variables as measured by X it^ ), the mobility process can be expressed by the equations (2) in the text. Consider the s = 2 example from equations (3) From this structure of correlation, multivariate normality implies that: 
where the vector has components with subscripts ij denoting the individual-employer match and superscripts s(i; t)e denoting seniority and the equation number (e = 1 for the mobility equation; e = 2 for the wage equation). This last result is useful for estimation since the likelihood does not involve multiple integration of the normal distribution as shown by
The contribution to the log likelihood of this sequence of observations is
where R it 0 (i)+sj = 1 when R it 0 (i)+sj > 0: More generally, the log likelihood for person i who arrived at date t 0 (i) in …rm j and stayed exactly S periods (i.e., with one entry wage and S 1 observed wages in …rm j after this initial date) is:
Starting-wage Equation Estimates Table B1 presents the results for the starting wage equation. We present only the coe¢ cients and not the standard errors, which are not directly delivered by the Abowd et al. (2003) estimation technique. Standard errors could be obtained by subtracting the estimated person and …rm e¤ects from the wage and rerunning the regression on the observed characteristics contained in this table. In general, the coe¢ cients in this table are at least 100 times their standard errors.
Appendix C: Correction of Estimation Errors
We start with a simple linear performance equation
with " ! N 0; 2 " i.i.d. and where X comes from a …rst step equation and, therefore, is measured with error following b X = X + in which i ! N (0; i ). We know the probability distribution of for each observation since the …rst-step estimation delivered a variance-covariance matrix for each …rm (set of parameters).
We derive the estimating formula for together with its associated variance-covariance matrix. Rewriting the above equations, we have
Assuming that " is not correlated with gives
By taking the average over the observations, the above implies:
Then, by noting that " i and i are uncorrelated among themselves as well as with X i , we see that the second and third components of the above equality tend to zero. An empirical counterpart for the …rst component is needed. Even though we do not know i , we know its probability distribution. We estimate the mean of the variance of the residuals by its empirical counterpart:
Hence, an estimator of is:
The di¤erence between and its estimator is given by:
Now consider the variance of the following random variable of dimension (k; 1)
By the central limit theorem, the variance of b (1) can be deduced from the variancecovariance matrix of i . We have
Focusing on the …rst element, we see that
i where v 0 i is a normal vector with unit variance, we have
The variance-covariance matrix is rewritten as a function of k and k 0 as follows.
Hence,
2 0 i = 0 since it is an odd moment. Taken together, this implies that
Now, with this estimation of V ( i ) we obtain the variance of b (1)
To estimate 2 " we use a consistent estimate of to obtain
where b u i denotes the residual of the equation. This framework is easily adapted to one where some of the X's would be measured without error, as in our problem. In this situation, i could fail to be invertible. We rewrite the problem distinguishing between X e , the variables measured with error and X s , those variables measured without error.
Then,
So that b (3) is a consistent estimator. Unfortunately, the above estimators pose practical problems because some estimates of b X are too imprecise. Those b X that are the least precise make b (3) almost impossible to interpret. However, one way to address this di¢ culty is by weighting the estimator presented above by the inverse of the variance of the b X i . In practice, it is much easier to use the trace of the variance covariance matrix estimated at the …rm-level. Therefore, noting that
Since " i and i are independent and uncorrelated with X i , the second term of the previous equation tends to 0. To obtain an estimate of the …rst term, we do the following. The mean of the variance of the residuals can be estimated using the data as
An estimator of can be written as
The di¤erence between and its estimator is given by
and computations similar to those presented above allow us to compute the variance matrix of the estimator. Number of previous jobs Seniority in the previous job Notes: Correlations are computed using the firm-speccific estimates of the parameters of the mobility and wage equations. The mobility and the wage equations are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. For each firm in the sample, there is a set of estimated parameters used to compute the correlation. Parameters are only estimated for those firms in which there is enough within-firm variability. The estimated correlations are corrected for the estimated error in the firm-specific parameters (see Appendix C). Bold indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level or less (standard errors are given below the correlation). Number of observations (firms): 2,507. Sources: DADS. Tenure (less than two years)
Low general education
Notes: Correlations are computed using the firm-speccific estimates of the parameters of the mobility and wage equations. The mobility and the wage equations are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. For each firm in the sample, there is a set of estimated parameters used to compute the correlation. Parameters are only estimated for those firms in which there is enough within-firm variability. The estimated correlations are corrected for the estimated error in the firm-specific parameters (see Appendix C). Bold indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level or less (standard errors are given below the correlation). Number of observations (firms): 2,507. Sources: DADS.
High general education
Number of previous jobs High general education Notes: Correlations are computed using the firm-speccific estimates of the parameters of the mobility and wage equations. The mobility and the wage equations are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. For each firm in the sample, there is a set of estimated parameters used to compute the correlation. Parameters are only estimated for those firms in which there is enough within-firm variability. The estimated correlations are corrected for the estimated error in the firm-specific parameters (see Appendix C). Bold indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level or less (standard errors are given below the correlation). Number of observations (firms): 2,507. Sources: DADS.
Nb previous jobs
Seniority previous job Correlation between mobility and future wage (ρ 1 )
Correlation between mobility and past wage (ρ 2 ) Notes: Correlations are computed using the estimates of the firm-specific parameters of the mobility and wage equations. The mobility and wage equations are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. For each firm in the sample, there is a set of estimated parameters used to compute the correlation. Parameters are only estimated for those firms in which there is enough within-firm variability. The estimated correlation is corrected for the estimation error of the firm-specific parameters. Bold indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level or less (standard errors are given below the correlation). Number of observations (firms): 2,507. Sources: DADS.
Correlation between mobility and past wage (ρ 2 ) Standard error of the wage shock (in logs) 
